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ABSTRACT
Determination an optimal cigarette excise tax is essential for the 
government to ensure that price of cigarette after tax is high enough to 
reduce consumption of cigarette and generate maximum tax revenue 
to the government. It is timely that government should consider having 
a specific tobacco control policy funded from earmarking of revenues 
from cigarette tax increases or “sin tax”. The estimated regression of 
optimal cigarette tax is based on Laffer cuve equation. In this study, 
the estimated optimal real excise tax rate is 0.216 sen or 0.262 nominal 
excise tax rate per stick, which is 16.5% higher than the excise tax rate 
in 2009. The increase in real revenue that can be earned after imposing 
an optimal excise tax is 18% and 23.6% in the short run and long 
run respectively. The expected reduction in consumption per capita for 
cigarette is 6.4% in the short run and 11.6% in the long run.
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INTRODUCTION
Cigarette Tax in Malaysia
As for year 2012, the excise tax on cigarette is 49% or 26 sen per stick of the retail 
price which is still lower than 70% suggested by Frame Convention on Tobacco 
Control (FCTC). Cigarette tax is collected from cigarette manufacturers or cigarette 
importers. Until 2004, taxes on tobacco were levied according to their weight. In 
2005, Malaysia has adopted a specific excise tax per stick and this tax structure 
is easier to administer since it requires only counting the sticks without weighing 
them. Table 1.0 shows the cigarette taxes imposed by the Malaysia government 
from 1990 until 2010. Both the excise tax and import tax imposed on cigarettes 
are increasing however, the sales tax remains fixed at 15% from 1990 to 1999 and 
increase to 25% from 2001 to 2010.
* Corresponding Author: E-mail: norashidah@upm.edu.my
Any remaining errors or omissions rest solely with the author(s) of this paper.
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Table 1 Cigarette Taxes 1990 – 2010
Year
Import tax Nominal excise tax Sales tax
RM/kg or RM/stick RM/kg or RM/stick %
1990 85/0.08 13/0.013 15
1991 135/0.12 14/0.014 15
1992-1998 162/0.15 28.60/0.028 15
1999-2000 180/0.16 40/0.039 15
2001 180/0.16 40/0.039 25
2002 216/0.2 48/0.047 25
2003 259/0.24 58/0.056 25
2004 200/0.18 58/0.056 25
2005* 0.20 0.081 25
2006 0.20 0.12 25
2007 0.20 0.15 25
2008 0.2 0.18 25
2009 0.2 0.225 25
2010 0.2 0.26 25
*Specific tax per stick was introduced (1 kg = 1100 sticks)
Source: Royal Custom Malaysia and Confederation of Malaysia Tobacco (CMTM), various years.
The Malaysian Government earns a large amount of revenue from its 
involvement in the tobacco industry. In 2010, revenue from the excise tax on 
cigarette is 2% from the total revenue of excise tax collected by the government. 
It is estimated that an increase of 10% in cigarette tax would lead to an increase 
almost 7% in government revenue (World Bank 1999). Hana and Nabilla (2007) 
predicted that the impact of a 25% increase in cigarette excise tax in Malaysia 
would result 20.8% increase in cigarette tax revenue.
Figure 1 shows the relationship between the excise tax on cigarette and tax 
revenue generated by government. 
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Figure 1 Tax revenue vs excise tax rate (1990 – 2010)
World Bank (1999) reported, in 1995 the average percentage of all government 
revenue derived from tobacco tax was 0.63% and middle-income countries averaged 
only 0.42%. Since the current excise tax of cigarette in Malaysia is only 49% of the 
retail price, thus government should continue to increase the excise tax on cigarette 
to reduce cigarette consumption. Increasing excise tax rate up to the optimal level 
will enable the government to generate maximum tax revenue. The availability of 
tobacco tax revenue can be allocated for earmarking the portion of it for funding 
health promotion activities including tobacco control program. For example one of 
the largest China’s cities, Chongquing and several USA states earmark a portion of 
tobacco taxes for tobacco-related education programs, counter-advertising and other 
tobacco control activities (Chaloupka et al., 2000). Learning from the experience 
of those countries, successful earmarking of tobacco revenue in Malaysia would 
have positive effect in reducing cigarette consumption and potentially provide fund 
for better health care and services for the Malaysian population.
LITERATURE REVIEW
There are several reasons for raising cigarette excise taxes such as; to increase 
government revenue, to protect children and youth, to improve public health 
and to correct externalities. These entire reasoning further pose a question as to 
what is the optimal tax that should be imposed on cigarette. From the economic 
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perspective, the optimal tax can be achieved when the marginal cost of the last 
cigarette consumed equals to its marginal social benefits. However, according to 
Warner et al. (1995) and Chaplouka et al. (2000) evaluation and identification of 
the negative externalities associated with direct smoking and direct environmental 
effect from tobacco smoke are abundant and complicated. Therefore for a country 
to set the level of tax, it should take into account the national health objectives and 
also depends on societal value such as the extent to which the children should be 
protected from the effect of smoke polluted environment. Apart from the health and 
social objectives of imposing tax on cigarettes, some governments may levy taxes 
with the intention of maximizing revenues. An empirical evidence from a study 
in South-East Asia reports on the potential revenue generated from tobacco taxes 
(Arunatilake, 2002). This study assumes that the real GDP per capita in the region 
was growing at 4% annually and a 5% increase in real cigarette prices induced by 
higher taxes would generate substantial additional revenue for the region by 2010. 
The fundamental principle related to efficiency of taxation is that the generated 
tax revenues from higher cigarette price due to increase in cigarette tax should 
minimize the welfare losses. As stated by Ramsey, (1927); Baumol and Bradford, 
(1970), the criteria for economic efficiency in taxation are; it should have the effect 
of reducing demand for all commodities in the same proportion, it should distort 
consumer choice as little as possible, and direct tax payers as little as possible to 
less preferred patterns of consumption. Taxes discourage people from buying the 
products and lead to an efficiency loss. This efficiency loss is called the ‘excess 
burden of tax’ or ‘deadweight loss’ (Zee, 1995). The following Figure 2.0 illustrates 
the welfare loss due to the increased tax on cigarettes.
Figure 2 Welfare loss due to cigarette tax
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Assume that cigarette supply curve (S0) is perfectly elastic so that firms are 
willing to supply an unlimited amount of cigarette at the current price. At E, marginal 
social costs (MSC) is equal to marginal social benefit (MSB) or MSC0 = MSB0 = 
MSB1. Imposition of a unit tax ‘T’ will shift supply curve parallel upward to S1. 
At a new price, PE + T, MSC1 > MSB0 and MSB1. Dead weight loss arises because 
the marginal social cost exceeds the marginal social benefit and it equals the loss 
in consumer surplus which is represented by area EFG for demand curve D0 and 
area EIH for demand curve D1. The loss in consumer surplus or the excess burden 
of tax is greater for the elastic demand curve (D0). This is because more people are 
changing their consumption decisions as the elasticity increases.
A good tax policy by the government is to set taxes for products which creates 
the least economic distortion. Ramsey (1927) designs an optimal tax theory that 
identifies distortion minimizing tax policy and the second best levels of taxes. 
He argues that the second best tax policy should prescribe tax rates on different 
commodities as inversely link to their demand elasticity. The “Ramsey Rule” states 
that tax rate should vary inversely with the elasticity of demand for products by 
holding the elasticity of supply constant. Products with very inelastic demand such 
as cigarettes should bear the highest tax rate due to its addictive capacity. This 
will minimize consumer’s loss of utility associated with a tax by minimizing the 
need to forego consumption they would prefer in order to avoid paying the tax. 
Chaloupka et al. (2000) find most estimation for the price elasticity of demand for 
cigarettes from the literatures on high-income countries is between -0.25 to -0.50. 
In contrast, demand is more responsive among low-income and middle-income 
countries that are in the range of -0.50 to -1.00. Given this evidence of inelastic 
demand for cigarettes, taxes on cigarettes appear to satisfy the Ramsey Rule. Not 
only that increases in taxes lead to significant reductions in cigarette smoking but 
also at the same time leads to significant increase in tax revenue. In an estimation 
by Sunley, Yurekli and Chaloupka (2000), an increase of 10% in cigarette taxes 
would lead to an increase of almost 7% on average in cigarette tax revenues. 
The rate of cigarette excise tax that maximized revenue can be illustrated 
using the Laffer curve. A Laffer curve is a parabola showing the relationship 
between tax revenue and the tax rate. Tax revenues are the product of the tax 
rate, t and the tax base, x, written as a function of the tax rate. There is a negative 
relationship between tax rates and tax bases. Changes in tax rates have two effects 
on revenues: the arithmetic effect and the economic effect. The arithmetic effect 
is simply when tax rates are lowered, tax revenues per dollar of tax base will be 
lowered by the amount of the decrease in the rate. And, the reverse is true for an 
increase in tax rates. The economic effect from lower tax rates gives the positive 
impact on work, output, and employment and thus providing incentives to increase 
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these activities. However, raising tax rates have the opposite economic effect by 
penalizing participation in the taxed activities. The arithmetic effect always works 
in the opposite direction from the economic effect. Therefore, the combination 
of both effects will not give an obvious consequence of the changes in tax rates 
on total tax revenue. The economist, Arthur Laffer (1986) suggests that beyond 
some tax rate, higher tax rate will shrink the tax base so much that revenues will 
actually decline. Figure 3.0 is a Laffer curve illustrates the relationship between 
tax revenue and the tax rate.
Figure 3 Laffer curve
In Figure 3.0, T* represents the optimal tax rate that maximizes tax revenue. 
Laffer curve supports the supply-side argument that tax revenue will fall if 
government raises tax rate above a certain point (optimal point). Revenue yield will 
be zero when the tax rate is zero, and increases as the tax rate increases, reaches 
a maximum and eventually declines as the tax rates become more excessive. The 
tax rate that maximizes tax revenue is called the optimal tax rate. Using the Laffer 
curve model to derive the relationship between the excise rate and budget revenue 
in Ukrainian tobacco industry, Krasovsky et al., (2001) estimates the revenue 
maximizing excise rate is approximately 11.3% in constant 1997 Hryvnias currency. 
The excise rate in Ukraine in 2001 is on the upward sloping portion of the Laffer 
curve, therefore budget revenues can be significantly increased if the excise rate 
is increased. A study in South Africa by Van Walbeek, 2000 using a Laffer Curve 
theory for years 1998 and 1999, find that if the government set the tax at the revenue 
maximizing levels, an additional revenue of R700 million and R300 million for 
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these two years can be generated. In theory, there is a trade off in raising cigarette 
taxes. Government gets more revenue on the packs of cigarettes sold, but there are 
likely to be fewer packs sold as the tax rates increase and eventually tax revenue 
will decline.
Clausing (2007) provides convincing evidence for the hypothesized parabolic 
relationship between corporate tax rates and corporate tax revenue for the sample 
of OECD countries being studied. In addition, she finds the estimated revenue-
maximizing corporate income tax rate is 33% for the whole sample. This study has 
been extended from 1980 to 2005 for OECD countries and confirmed the evidence 
of Laffer curve existence in the corporate tax sphere throughout most of the sample 
period (Brill and Hassett, 2007)
Numerous studies in both low and high-income countries have confirmed 
that increasing tax is highly effective and practical way to correct economic 
inefficiencies in tobacco markets (Jha and Chaloupka, 1999; Hu, 1997). Increase 
in taxes would increase the retail price of cigarettes and hence discourage youths 
from smoking.  Using data from the 1997 Harvard School of Public Health College 
Alcohol Study, Czart, Pacula and Chaloupka (2001) provides strong evidence that 
raising cigarette taxes and therefore the increase in cigarette prices discourage 
both smoking participation and the level of smoking among young adults. These 
arguments are strengthened by a systematic review which concludes that increasing 
the price of cigarette reduces not only the number of adolescents and young adults 
who smoke but also the quantity consumed (Hopkins et al., 2001).
The revenue generated from taxing cigarettes can be used to support anti-
smoking activities such as tobacco-related education and prevention effort, media 
campaigns and other public health efforts. Several U.S. states and many policy 
makers of other countries have earmark part of the revenue churns from this 
cigarette taxes to promote public health and more directly to cover the social costs 
resulting from cigarette smoking. The 1988 California Tax and Health Promotion 
Act (Proposition 99) have explicitly specified the use of tax revenue for health-
education programs for the prevention and reduction of cigarette use, impoverished 
health care and conduct research activities on cigarette usage (Bal et al., 1990). 
Countries like Egypt and Nepal earmark the tax revenue to subsidized medical 
expenditures for low income families and in Victoria, Australia, a 5% tax was 
levied on the sale of tobacco products in 1986 for health promotion (Hu, 1997). 
The use of earmarked taxes to fund health promotion and disease prevention are 
consistent with the ‘benefit principal’ of taxation. Higher taxes can reduce the 
producer loss and/or consumer surplus (Hu, Xu and Keeler, 1998). Given that many 
publicly provided health insurance programs target lower-income populations, thus 
earmarking the revenue is consistent with the overall system of taxes and transfers 
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of revenue that promotes vertical equity. Moreover, cigarette tax increases that are 
earmarked for anti-tobacco media campaigns, prevention program and subsidization 
of tobacco cessation products generate even larger reductions in cigarette use and 
improvement in health. Hu, Xu and Keeler (1998), analyse that many activities 
funded by earmarked tobacco taxes significantly reduce the welfare losses resulting 
from tobacco tax increases.
MODEL AND METHOD
The economist Arthur Laffer suggests that beyond some tax rate, higher tax rate 
will significantly reduce the tax base and eventually revenues will decline. The 
Laffer curve shows the relationship between tax rate and tax base and their impact 
on revenue. The following is the mathematical derivation for a Laffer curve:
R = t × B (1)
where, R is revenue, t is the tax rate and B is the tax base.
B = α – βt,  β > 0 (2)
Substituting equation (1) into (2) provides:
R = t(α – βt) = αt – βt2 (3)
As the assumed goal of governments is to maximize revenues, differentiating 
equation (3) with respect to t gives the following first-order condition:
t
R t2 0
2
2
a b= - =  (4)
The second-order condition:
t
R 2 02
2
2
2
1b=-  (5)
Equation (4) and (5) are necessary and sufficient conditions for maximum 
respectively. Solving for t*:
*
2
t
b
a
=  , where *t  = the optimal tax.  (6)
An empirical estimation of a Laffer curve is based on the revenue equation (3), hence 
a Laffer curve  equation for a single tax becomes:
Rt  = α0 + δ1 Tt + δ2 T2t  + δ4Yt +  εt, (7)
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where t indicates years, R is real tax revenue from cigarettes, T is the real excise 
tax  on per stick of cigarette measured in Ringgit, Y  is real income per capita and 
transformed into natural logarithm, and εt is the error term. T2 is real excise tax 
squared. The inclusion of both tax rate and its square in the regression equation 
is to allow for the relationship between revenue and tax rate to be non-linear as 
depicted by Laffer curve model. Both R and T are adjusted for the inflation using 
the consumer price index (CPI) with year 2000 as the base year.
All the variables of the Laffer curve in equation (7) are tested for their stationarity. 
For this purpose, three tests for stationarity are performed: the Augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) test, the Phillips-Peron (PP) test and the Kwiatkownski-Phillips-
Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) test. A requirement for the existence of cointegration relation 
between a set of I(1) is necessary to further estimates a long run parameters using 
Fully Modified Ordinary Least Square (FMOLS) method. FMOLS developed by 
Phillips & Hansen (1990) is an efficient method of estimating equilibrium economic 
relationship for small samples analysis. The FMOLS estimator corrects the demand 
model’s variables for endogeneity due to cointegration and modifies least square to 
account for serial correlation effects. FMOLS yields t-ratios that are asymptotically 
normally distributed and is independent of the correct choice of lag length of the 
underlying vector autoregression. According to Borland and Quliaris (1994), the 
FMOLS estimator permits inference based on normal distribution theory ‘by means 
of a nonparametric correction’ to the data that effectively eliminates any long-run 
dependence between the true residuals of the cointegrating regression and the 
innovations of the explanatory variables.
In order to estimate the impact of increase excise tax rate of cigarette on the 
expected government revenue, the following mathematical relationship between 
the changes in the excise tax rate and government revenue is applied (Van Walbeck, 
2000):
TR
d TR
T
d T
x P
T1 n= + n
^ ^ ah h k9 C (8)
Where TR
d TR^ h  is the percentage change in government revenue
 T
d T^ h  is a changes in the excise tax rate, nn  is the price elasticity of demand
And P
T  is the tax proportion of the retail price of cigarette.
Equation 8.0 shows that an increase in government revenue as a result of an 
increase in the tax rate is inversely proportional to the absolute size of the price 
elasticity. A relatively inelastic demand implies greater revenue potential and vice 
versa.
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The empirical analysis for optimal tax rate in this study was carried out using 
quarterly data for the period 1980 to 2009. These data was obtained from the Royal 
Custom of Malaysia and Department of Statistic Malaysia.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The estimated model of optimal cigarette tax is:
Rt  = α0 + δ1 Tt + δ2 T2t  + δ4Yt +  εt,
where t indicates years, R is real tax revenue from cigarettes, T is the real excise 
tax  on per stick of cigarette measured in Ringgit, Y  is real income per capita and 
transformed into natural logarithm, and εt is the error term. T2 is real excise tax 
square.
The three tests of stationarity are performed on the variables R, T, T2 (TS) and Y 
in levels and in first differences, with the optimal lag lengths for each test determined 
by the E-View 6 software. The results of the unit root tests are shown in Table 2.
Table 2
ADF tests PP tests KPSS tests
Level
R 1.596 -5.624*** 0.858***
T 1.383 0.132 0.842***
TS 1.674 0.499 0.721**
Y -1.735 1.958 0.981***
First Difference
∆R -6.779*** -26.633*** 0.304
∆T -2.832** -9.567*** 0.256
∆TS -5.905*** -8.461*** 0.307
∆Y -9.989*** -9.879*** 0.213
Notes: ADF indicates the Augmented Dickey Fuller test, PP indicates Phillips-
Peron tests and KPSS indicates Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin test. The 
following notation applies; R= Real Revenue, T=real excise tax rate, Y = real 
income per capita and TS = real excise tax squared. All the lags values and 
bandwith are automatically determined by E-views-6. The lags for ADF tests are 
chosen based on SIC, while the bandwidths for the PP and KPSS tests are based 
on the Newey-West Bandwith.
‘***’ indicates the test statistic is significant at the 1% significance level, ‘**’ 
indicates the 5% significance level, and ‘*’ indicates the 10% significance level. 
The model includes constant without trend.
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From the above table, ADF and PP are tested at 5% level and they do not 
reject the null hypothesis of a unit root for the series of T, TS and Y. The KPSS test 
rejects the null hypothesis of stationarity for all variables at level, at 1% significant 
level except for TS rejected at 5% level.  However, for R series, even though PP 
test rejects the null hypothesis at 1% significant level, but the KPS test and ADF 
test produce strong indication that the series is integrated of order 1, or I(1) at 1% 
significance level. Hence, there are enough proof to conclude that all the variables 
R, T, TS and Y series are following I(1) process.
Since all the variables are I(1), the cointegration technique originally designed 
by  Phillips and Hansen (1990); Pedroni, (1995, 2000); and Phillips and Moon, 
(1999), the Fully Modified Ordinary Least Square (FMOLS) is employed. Table 
3.0 shows the estimation results from the FMOLS analysis.
Table 3 Results of the FMOLS estimation
R = –183.7221 + 28.1669Tt – 0.65320T2t – 4,3147Tt-1 + 20.8322 lnYt
 (–0.73059) (2.7982)*** (–1.4106) (0.80937) (0.63354)
ADF[2] = –5.367537*** Error-correction term = –1.0894 ***
Notes: The following notation applies; R= Real Revenue, T=real excise tax rate, Y = real income per 
capita and T2 = real excise ta squared “***” indicates the test statistic is significant at the 1% significance 
level, “**” indicates the 5% significance level and “*” at 10% significance level. [ ] denotes lags and 
figures in parentheses ( ) refer to t statistics.
The above results report that R, T, T2 ,  Tt-1,  and lnY  do form a cointegrating 
link. The ADF test performed on residuals from the estimating equation is highly 
significant which confirmed the existence of long-run equilibrium relationship 
among the variables. This implies that all the variables drift together in the long 
run. The speed of adjustment which is the coefficient of error correction term 
indicates that the disequilibrium is corrected more than 100% over quarterly at 1% 
significance level. A highly significant error correction term is a further proof of the 
existence of a stable long run relationship. As expected, the estimated coefficient of 
T’s sign is positive and significant at 1% level. The positive sign of T implies that 
increases in real excise tax rate will increase the tax revenue. The opposite sign for 
the tax rate squared (T2) captured the diminishing effects of the tax in the parabolic 
equation which is a pattern consistent with the Laffer curve shape. However, the 
estimated coefficients of other variables are insignificant determinant of real tax 
revenue in this model. 
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In order to determine the optimal tax rates that maximizes tax revenue, the 
real revenue (R) is differentiate with respect to real tax rate (T), 
R = –183.7221 + 28.1669 Tt – 0.65320 T2t  – 4.3147 Tt-1 + 20.8322 lnYt
R T2 2  = 28.1669 – 2(0.65320)Tt
A necessary condition for revenue maximization is R T2 2  = 0
Therefore T = 21.56
And since R T2 22 2  = negative, thus it is confirmed that T = 21.56% is the 
optimal real excise tax rate that maximizes tax revenue. The calculated real optimal 
excise tax rate is higher than all the value of real excise tax rate from 1980 to 2009, 
with the highest real excise tax rate in 2009 is 18.5%. Therefore the calculated 
optimal real excise tax rate is 16.5% higher than the real excise tax rate in 2009. 
To determine the impact of optimal real excise tax rate on expected government 
revenue and consumption, the estimated price elasticity of demand and tax elasticity 
from study done by Norashidah, 2012 was used. She found the price elasticity of 
demand for cigarette is –0.199 in the short run and -0.930 in the long run. While 
the estimated tax elasticity of demand for cigarette is -0.390 and -0.704 in the short 
run and long run respectively.
Therefore from the estimated coefficient of price elasticity of demand and apply 
the mathematical relationship between changes in tax revenue and changes in the 
excise tax rate derived in Equation 8.0, the expected increase in government revenue 
will be 18% in the short run and 23.6% in the long run due to 16.5% increase in real 
excise tax rate. It should also note that the excise tax proportion of the retail price 
of cigarette in 2009 is 46.4%. Reduction in consumption of cigarette is expected 
to be 6.4% and 11.6% in short run and long run respectively.
In determining the optimal cigarette tax, many related factors such as generated 
tax revenue, society values and reduced cigarette consumption have to be taken into 
consideration. The economic terms of the optimal tax is when the marginal social 
cost of the last cigarette consumed is equal to the marginal social benefits. However, 
as mentioned earlier, the magnitude of these social costs and benefits is unknown 
and impossible to measure. Thus, the objective of determining the optimal tax in 
this study using the Laffer curve framework is only to maximize tax revenue and 
also to reduce cigarette consumption without taking into consideration the societal 
cost related to tax issues.
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CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATION
The estimation of optimal cigarette tax is done using the Laffer curve model and 
the estimated optimal real excise tax rate is 21.56% which is 16.5% higher the 
real excise tax rate in 2009. Imposing the optimal tax on cigarettes would increase 
revenue generated by the government, where the expected increase in government 
revenue in short run is 18% and 23.6% in long run Currently; the excise tax rate is 
still below the optimal tax rate level.  Theoretically, this means revenue generated is 
at the steep increasing slope of the Laffer curve, which indicates a steady increase in 
government revenue. Therefore the government should work to increase the excise 
tax rate to its optimal level. Besides that the proportion of current excise tax on 
cigarette is only about 49% of the retail price of cigarette, which is lower than the 
suggested proportion of 70% by FCTC. It is recommended that the government 
should continue to increase the excise tax level imposed on cigarette to achieve 
higher revenue and to attain the targeted excise tax rate suggested by FCTF. 
Excise tax as part of tobacco control policy has proven to be successful; both 
in reducing tobacco consumption and in increasing revenue in developing as 
well as developed countries (Hana and Nabila, 2007, Townsend, 1996, Shibuya 
et al., 2003, Baltagi and Levin, 1986). Higher excise tax rate on cigarette will 
be passed to the consumer in terms of higher price of cigarette. In this study the 
negative relationship between price and demand of cigarette will further decrease 
consumption of cigarette estimated at 6.4% and 11.6% in the short run and long 
run, respectively.
However, a large increase in cigarette tax has greater tendency to induce 
smokers to opt for illegal cigarettes. Therefore the enforcement against the snuggling 
and selling of illegal cigarettes must be stricter and increase simultaneously with 
tax. Even though the excise tax increases in legal cigarettes leads to an increase 
in illegal cigarettes’ trade, tax increase still bring greater revenues and ultimately 
reduce consumption (Merriman, 2002). 
In order to maximize the taxation effect and hence reduce smoking, government 
should efficiently allocate the tax revenue for tobacco control program and 
strategies. According to Asia Pacific Report Card (SEATCA 2009), there is no tax or 
pricing policy in Malaysia with the aimed to contribute towards health objectives. It 
is timely that government should consider having a specific tobacco control policy 
funded from earmarking of revenues from cigarette tax increases or “sin tax”. The 
policy should be targeted to increase awareness about the consequences of smoking 
habits, to reduce larger proportion of tobacco consumption and to reduce tobacco-
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related illness and death. The collected revenue from the sin tax can be channeled 
to more comprehensive programs addressing the issues of health consequences of 
tobacco use, increase awareness on the danger of smoking, educational strategies 
for smoking prevention and other related activities.  The source of funding for those 
health programs through earmarking can eradicate any conflicts of interest between 
non-smokers taxpayers and smokers since the earmarked revenue is generated from 
the consumers who smoke.  Thailand is one of the countries which has earmarked 
2% of the revenues generated from cigarette and alcohol to establish Thai Health 
Promotion Foundation (Thai Health) in 2001.
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